A STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: A COMPARED THEORETICAL-METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the comparative method is one of the most robust strategies for analyzing the evolution of intelligence services, one of the most enigmatic objects in the structure of the states. Whether in countries under a consolidated or still incipient democracy, such services, as political-institutional apparatuses often closed to inspection and control (accountability), can be better analyzed by the comparativist method. Institutional enigmas or not, intelligence agencies (as well as the systems they form and integrate) are always the reflection of choices and agendas of state elites. They go far beyond mere technical institutions; they have a political ethos that affects their complex activities and interests, especially in the processes of political and social change. The comparative approach is an effective tool for understanding this political nature, the strategic possibilities of its actors and the political and institutional boundaries of these agencies, which often operate in a gray area.